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INDICATORS OF MANAGERIAL CONSCIOUSNESS
IN AN URBAN JUDICIAL BUREAUCRACY
By JAMES A. GAZELL*
INTRODUCTION
W HAT can be done to make certain that civil con-
flict is resolved in the peaceful arena of the court-
room and that criminal charges lead to justice for both
the accused and the community?
We must make it possible for judges to spend more
time judging, by giving them professional help for ad-
ministrative tasks ....
We have to find ways to clear the courts of the
endless stream of "victimless crimes" that get in the
way of serious consideration of serious crimes ....
We should open our eyes- as the medical profes-
sion is doing-to the use of paraprofessionals in the
law. Working under the supervision of trained attorneys,
"parajudges" could deal with many of the essentially
administrative matters of the law, freeing the judge to
do what only he can do: to judge .... In addition we
should take advantage of many technical advances, such
as electronic information retrieval, to expedite the re-
sult in both new and traditional areas of the law ....
And I endorse the concept of a suggestion made by
Chief Justice [Warren E.] Burger: the establishment of
a National Center for State Courts. This will make it
possible for state courts to conduct research into prob-
lems of procedure, administration and training for state
and local judges and their administrative personnel.
It could serve as a clearinghouse for the exchange of
information about state court problems and reforms.'
This recent comment by President Richard M. Nixon exem-
plifies the growing inclination of present and former public offi-
cials,2 government commissions,3 scholars,4 and the mass media 5
Associate Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies at Cali-
fornia State University at San Diego; Ph.D. in Government, 1968, South-
ern Illinois University.
'Nixon, Reforming the Administration of Justice, 57 A.B.A.J. 422-24
(1971).
2 See, e.g., R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 196-200 (1970); Burger, Deferred
Maintenance, 57 A.B.A.J. 425 (1971); Burger, The State of the Federal
Judiciary-1971, 57 A.B.A.J. 855 (1971); Tydings, Modernizing the
Administration of Justice, 50 JUDICATURE 258 (1967); Warren, New Disci-
pline: Judicial Administration, 4 TRIAL 9 (1967-68).
3 See, e.g., NATIONAL ADvISORY COMMISSION ON CiviL DISORDERS, THE RE-
PORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD ON CIVwL DIoRDERs 183-94
(1968); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY
125-54 (1967); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 80-91
(1967).
4 See, e.g., J. CAMPBELL, J. SAHID & D. STANG, LAW AND ORDER RECON-
sm EB 554-73 (1970); K. DOLBEARE, TRIAL COURrs IN URBAN POLITICS
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to view trial courts as bureaucracies whose maintenance rests
considerably on their managerial capability. This view arises be-
cause, especially in urban areas, the federal and state trial
courts have failed to exhibit sufficient managerial efficiency in
solving such critical problems as the mounting congestion of
criminal and civil cases, a malady that threatens to immobilize
this middle sector of the justice system funnel6 (see figure 1).
This article, finished in June 1972, explores the existence
of management consciousness in judicial organizations. Because
judges are the traditional court managers, the study, conducted
in September-October 1971, focuses on them. Forming the basis
of the article is an investigation of the first part of a three-part
managerial consciousness model which posits how judicial or-
ganizations maintain themselves. This model suggests that (1)
the acquisition and degree of managerial consciousness varies
directly with the gravity of the internal problems and external
pressures confronting an organization; (2) this consciousness
results in substantial changes in judicial operations to alleviate
the intra-organization and extra-organization pressures; (3) the
2-3 (1967); J. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM
2-28 (1969); E. FRIESEN, E. GALLAS & N. GALLAS, MANAGING THE COURTS
1-22 (1971) [hereinafter cited as MANAGING THE COUIrS]; H. JAMES,
CRISIS IN THE COURTS viii, 22, 25 (1967); J. JENNINGS, THE FLOW OF
ARRESTED ADULT DEFENDANTS THROUGH THE MANHATTAN CRIMINAL COURT
IN 1968 AND 1969 iii, v, 1-31 (1971); J. KLONOSKI & R. MENDELSOHN,
THE POLITICS OF LOCAL JUSTICE 5-7 (1970); H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN & B.
BUCHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT 71-222 (1959); E. Galias & N. Gallas,
Symposium on Judicial Administration, 31 PuB. AD. REV. 111-43 (1971).
5 See, e.g., Larsen, Why The Courts Are Clogged, 13 SAN FRANCISCO 50-52
(1971); Mills, Nothing To Do With Justice, LIFE, Mar. 12, 1971, at 57-60,
62-66, 68; Star, Jam-Up: Crisis in Our Criminal Courts, LOOK, Mar.
23, 1971, at 32-34, 39; Action to Help Clear Logjam in Courts, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Jan. 11, 1971, at 65; As I See It, FORBES, July 1, 1971, at
21-23; Interview with Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, U.S. NEWs &
WORLD REP., Dec. 14, 1970, at 32-45; What's Wrong with the Courts:
the Chief Justice Speaks Out, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 24, 1970,
at 68-71; Justice in America, COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.,
televised, Apr. 20, May 18, June 15, 1971 (three part series).
6 A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 70 (1967); D. EASTON, THE PoLmcAL
SYSTEM 96-100 (1953); D. EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL
LIFE 21-33 (1965); J. KLONOSKI & R. MENDELSOHN, supra note 4, at xviii;
T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43-51 (1962); R.
QUINNEY, CRIME AND JUSTICE IN SOCIETY 12-14 (1969); G. SCHUBERT,
JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING 105-07 (1965); E. SCHUR, LAW AND SOCIETY 180
(1968); 1. SHARKANSKY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 4-9 (1970); CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 1969 at 39, 66, 76, 85, 87, 97, 105, 106; Elden,
Systems Analysis Decision Theory, and the Behavioral Approach in the
Study of Jurisprudence 5-12 (unpublished masters thesis, San Diego
State College, 1968).
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FIGURE I A Funnel Model of a Typical Criminal and Civil















FIGURE 2 A Typical Judicial Subsystem: Within the Justice




















































I (Continuances, Motion, Retrials)
Middle of Funnel
changes, in correcting or ameliorating the problems, create less
serious troubles which further sharpen the managerial acumen
of judges as the pattern is repeated. Parts (2) and (3) are
presented here to demonstrate the importance of managerial
consciousness if judicial actors are to exert more control in prob-
lem-solving or if they are to more readily accept the stringent
administrative leadership, the loss of considerable autonomy,
and the drastic operational changes which may be required to




To test the acquisition and degree of managerial conscious-
ness, this study analyzed the Superior Court of San Diego
County, an urban trial court. This particular court was chosen
for two reasons. First, this study wanted to analyze managerial
consciousness only at the state trial court level because this is
where the bulk of judicial business begins and ends.9 Second,
this court's internal problem of court delay and external pres-
sure of threatened trial court consolidation are both typical of
the forces which produce managerial consciousness in other
urban trial courts. To determine the extent of judicial mana-
gerial consciousness regarding these two areas of delay and
consolidation, this study requested that 20 veteran judges, of
the 23 who held positions in this court in September-October
1971, complete a 14-question interview which measured the six
areas of consolidation, specialization, discipline, delay, leadership,
and ideology. The results of this study, which are analyzed in
the following pages, describe six specific limitations in the
acquisition and degree of managerial consciousness in the areas
of discipline, delay, and leadership. These limits show that
the lack of consciousness and the attitudes of these judges may
prevent their efficient management of the problems which con-
front the judicial organization.
I. A MANAGERIAL-CONSCIOUSNESS MODEL
Although occasional signs of managerial consciousness in
judicial milieus date from 1906,10 only within the last few years
has it risen sharply.11 The motivation for this consciousness has
stemmed mainly from two sources. One is the aggravation of
at least nine problems: the inveterate delay besetting most
state and urban trial courts; 12 a widespread fear that such delay
helps to increase crime rates by reducing the prospect of swift
and certain punishment for guilty defendants; 13 more frequent
courtroom disruptions; 14 the incidence of recently concluded and
9 K. DOLBEARE, supra note 4.
10 W. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICAL ADMINISTRATION 254-63, 338-50
(1929); Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Admin-
istration of Justice, 46 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 55 (1962); Pound, Organiza-
tion of Courts, 10 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 69 (1927).
11 See sources cited notes 1-5 supra.
12 D. KARLEN, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 60-61
(1970).
13 See sources cited note 5 supra.
14 Mosk, Justice in Violent Times, 211 THE NATION 431 (1970); Nord-
heimer, Security Grows Tighter in Nation's Courtrooms, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 17, 1971, § 1, at 48, cols. 1-8.
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pending trials with political overtones; 15 greater publicity for
judicial difficulties; 16 a tendency of scholars to focus on the de-
cisional and procedural aspects of courts rather than on the
administrative facets; 17 a failure of courts to apply technology -
especially computers - in order to raise the efficiency of judicial
operations;' 8 a neglect of such organizations, a condition that
Chief Justice Burger recently described as "deferred mainten-
ance;"' 9 and broad cultural ferment 20 (see figures 1 and 2).
A second source motivating management consciousness is
the extensive scope of the above-mentioned problems which
embrace numerous urban trial court jurisdictions. Illustrative
of this situation is the extent of delay in these organizations.
With regard to civil-jury delay (an area for which the most
data is publicly available), the average time from answer to
trial ranges from more than 5 years in the Circuit Court of
Cook County (Chicago), Illinois, to 2 years in the District
Court of Clark County (Las Vegas), Nevada. Falling between
these two boundaries are the trial courts of New York City;
Philadelphia and Norristown, Pennsylvania; Jersey City, New
Jersey; Boston, Cambridge, Lawrence, Dedham, and Spring-
field, Massachusetts; and Detroit, Michigan.21 With respect to
the criminal case delay (a topic for which only scattered infor-
mation is readily available), the lapse of time from filing to
disposition of such actions usually averages less than 1 year.
This situation predominates in all the cities of at least seven
states: Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New
15 See, e.g., Berrigan Jury Panel Nearing Completion, L.A. Times, Feb. 6,
1972, § A, at 11; Chicago 7 Cleared of Plot, 5 Guilty on Second Count,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1970, at 1, col. 2, at 14, cols. 1-8; Deadlock by Jury
Results in Seale-Huggins Mistrial, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1971, at 1, cols.
1-3, at 27, cols. 1-8; Ellsberg, Russo Charged in New Indictment on
Pentagon Papers, L.A. Times, Dec. 31, 1971, part 1, at 1, 6; Manson, 3
Girls Sentenced to Die, L.A. Times, Mar. 30, 1971, part 1, at 1, 3, 20;
Newton is Cleared of Charges in Slaying, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1971, at
53, cols. 3-5.
16 See sources cited note 5 supra.
17 MANAGING THE COURTS at 7-9.
18 Adams, The Movement Toward Modern Data Management in the Courts,
23 U. FLA. L. REV. 250 (1971).
19 Burger, supra note 2.
20A. TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 25, 44-47 (1970).
21 THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, INC., CALENDAR STATUS
STUDY -. 1971, STATE TRIAL COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION, PERSONAL
INJURY JURY CASES, AUGUST 1, 1971, at vii-ix (1971).
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Mexico, and New York.22
In explaining the time disparity for these two types of cases
it should be noted that delay in criminal cases is generally far
less severe than the delay in civil cases principally because
of the statutory priority accorded to criminal cases. For example,
criminal actions are moved more quickly because of short time
limits (often 60 to 90 days) and the extensive use of negotiated
pleas of guilty, which obviate lengthy trials.23 However, because
of these priorities, and the judicial personnel assigned to crim-
inal cases, a reduction of delay in criminal cases often does not
improve the overall delay problem because such a reduction
usually results in an aggravation of delay in the civil docket.
Aggravated judicial problems of widespread incidence tend
to motivate heightened managerial consciousness. At this point
it is useful to elaborate on the model which links these prob-
lems with organizational maintenance in a judicial setting. This
managerial-consciousness model 24 posits the following three
ideas. First, the acquisition and degree of managerial conscious-
ness varies directly with the gravity of the internal problems
and external pressures confronting an organization. Internal
difficulties include primarily a judicial resistance to substantial
change, which is reinforced by at least four mechanisms: habit,
an incessant stream of cases, traditionally broad discretion ac-
corded to judges in their efforts to surmount their workloads,
as well as a fear of diminished authority and status. The ex-
ternal pressures embrace four additional stimuli: growing popu-
lation, advancing technology, a desire to emulate programs that
succeed in other jurisdictions, and criticism from bar groups
and the mass media. Second, this consciousness results in sub-
stantial changes in judicial operations to alleviate these internal
problems and external pressures. Third, the accruing innova-
tions correct or ameliorate these problems but spawn a set of
less serious troubles, which further sharpen the managerial
acumen of judges as they repeat the problem-solving pattern.
22 Based on data supplied to the author on May 4 and Nov. 30, 1971, by
Mrs. Katherine Parkes, Librarian, The Institute of Judicial Administra-
tion, Inc., 40 Washington Square South, New York, N.Y. 10012.
23 See, e.g., A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 28-29 (1967); BUREAU OF
CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 1969, at
105 (1970); Task Force Reports on the Judicial Component of the Crimi-
nal-Justice System in Cook County, Illinois, Chicago Tribune, May 16-
23, 1971, § 1 [hereinafter cited as Task Force Reports].
24 W. BENNIS, ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT: ITS NATURE, ORIGINS AND PROS-
PECTS 22-23 (1969).
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II. MANAGERIAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN AN URBAN TRIAL COURT
A. Background Analysis
The above model only suggests a theoretical framework for
data-gathering; 25 it must be tested for evidence which confirms
or denies the suggested theses. San Diego County was chosen
because it epitomizes an expanding metropolitan area in three
notable respects. First, its population has mounted during the
last 50 years, particularly since 1940, as indicated in figure 3. By
1960, the San Diego metropolitan area ranked twenty-third na-
tionally in population, a position that it maintains a decade later.
In 1970, the only two California counties whose populations were
larger were Los Angeles and Orange with 7,032,075 and 1,420,386
respectively.
FIGURE 3 Population of San Diego County
26
Percentage Population Rank
Year: Census Increase in California
1920: 112,248 - 5th
1930: 209,659 86.8% 4th
1940: 289,348 33.2% 4th
1950: 556,808 92.5% 4th
1960: 1,033,011 85.5% 2nd
1970: 1,357,854 32.4% 3rd
Second, since the 1920's, the composite workload of the
Superior Court of San Diego County has increased, especially
within the last 30 years, almost as drastically as the population.
However, due to a corresponding rise in the number of judge-
ships allocated to this court, the workload for each judge has
fluctuated within a narrow range. In 1970, this organization
ranked second in California with respect to its total filings and
its number of judgeships 27 (see figure 4).
Third, despite sharp increases in population and in cumu-
lative workloads, the extent of delay in the handling of crimi-
nal and civil cases has risen only at a gradual rate in this trial
court (see figure 5).
25 0. GARCEOU, POLITICAL RESEARCH AND POLITICAL THEORY 4-5 (1968).
2 6 CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, 1970 CALIFORNIA ROSTER OF FEDERAL,
STATE, COUNTY AND CITY OFFICIALS 110 (1970); THE 1972 WORLD AL-
MANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 196 (1971).




FIGURE 4 Workload Changes
County
2 8
in the Superior Court of San Diego
Total No. of Total Filings
Year: Filings Judgeships per Judgeship
1926: 4,969 (0.0%) 4 (0.0%) 1,242 (0.0%)
1930: 5,088 (2.5%) 5 (25.0%) 1,018(-18.0%)
1940: 6,444(26.7%) 6 (16.7%) 1,074 (+5.5%)
1950: 11,112 (72.4%) 8 (33.3%) 1,389 (+29.3%)
1960: 18,848 (69.6%) 19 (137.5%) 992 (-28.6%)
1970: 32,260 (71.2%) 25 (31.6%) 1,290 (±30.0%)
FIGuRE 5 Scope of Criminal and Civil Case Delay in the Superior
Court of San Diego County29
Civil-Case
Criminal-Case Delay
Delay Rank in (Average Rank in
Year: (Median-Months) State Months) State
1963: - - 15.0 (0.0%) 7th
1964: - - 12.5(-16.7%) 6th
1965: - - 16.7(±33.6%) 3rd
1966: - - 16.3 (-2.4%) 7th
1967: - - 14.1 (-13.5%) 8th
1968: 2.7 (0.0%) 13th 17.6(+24.8%) 7th
1969: 2.9(-7.4%) 10th 18.8 (+6.8%) 7th
1970: 2.8(-3.4%) 12th 18.3 (-2.6%) 7th
1971: (Discontinued but - 16.6(±45.4%) 2nd
probably below 2.8)
This result probably stems from the efficiency of this or-
28 The Judicial Council of California was founded in 1926. CAL. CONST. art.
6, § la (1926). FIRST REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA
TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 56 (app. 1, 1927); THnD REPORT
OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGIS-
LATuRE 86-87 (apps. A-H, 1931); NINTH REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUN-
CIL OF CALIFORNIA TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 17, 27-31
(1943); THIRTEENTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALI-
FORNIA TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 54-55 (1950); EIGHTEENTH
BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA TO THE Gov-
ERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 198-99 (1961); 1971 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT
153 (1971).
29 See THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, CALENDAR STATUS
STUDY, PERSONAL INJURY JURY CASES 1-2 (1964); id. 1-2 (1965); id.
1-2 (1967); id. 1-2 (1969); id. 1-2 (1970); id. 2 (1971); JUDICIAL COUN-
CIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1971 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT 122 (1971); JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1972 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT 106, 112 (1972).
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ganization in expediting its business. However, three caveats
temper this assessment. One qualification is the incompleteness
of the delay information which dates from 1968 for criminal
cases and from 1963 for civil cases. A second cautionary note
is that, although one may garner data about the scope of the
backlog for this court since 1926, such information is virtually
worthless because one cannot validly equate backlog with delay.
On the one hand, backlog is only the number of cases - criminal,
civil, or both - that faces a court. The mere incidence of suits
fails to divulge the length of time required to handle them. On
the other hand, delay typically centers on the average or median
duration of an action from its filing to its disposition. Under
this distinction it is possible for some courts to face a large
backlog but only a short delay whereas other judicial organiza-
tions may encounter the opposite situation.30 A final limitation
is that the data on the scope of delay in this jurisdiction suggest
that its judges may be achieving consistent efficiency in the
handling of criminal cases at the price of substantially increased
delay in the adjudication of civil matters (see figure 5).
B. Methodology
A statement of the methodology employed in this study
necessitates brief chronological attention to five requirements.
First, the apposite indices were canvassed for previous studies of
this institution in order to ascertain and to consider the possible
adoption of their research techniques. However, there were no
published articles that examined this court.31 The nearest, re-
cent studies have centered on examinations of trial court oper-
ations in Los Angeles,32 San Francisco,33 the state of Califor-
nia,34 Chicago,35 and New York City.36
30 MANAGING THE COURTS at 62-63; H. ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 44.
31 Based on an exploration of the categories "Administration of Justice"
and "Courts" in THE INDEX To LEGAL PERIODICALS Vols. 1-16 (1926-72);
and in AN INDEX To LEGAL PERIODICALS LITERATURE Vols. 1-6 (1888-1937).
32 J. HOLBROOK, A SURVEY OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, Los ANGELES
AREA 3-404 (1956); THE SUPERIOR COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY, RE-
PORT OF THE SPECIAL JUDICIAL REFORM COMMITTEE FEBRUARY 1971, at
vii-xvi (1971).33THE SAN FRANCISCO COMMIrrEE ON CRIME, A REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL
COURTS OF SAN FRANCISCO, PART I, THE SUPERIOR COURT BACKLOG: CON-
SEQUENCES AND REMEDIES 12, 24, 26, 27, 30-34, 37-40, 43, 45-48 (1970); id.
PART II, BAIL AND O.R. RELEASE 46-49 (1971); THE SAN FRANCISCO COM-
IVIITTEE ON CRIME, A REPORT ON NON-VICTIM CRIME IN SAN FRANCISCO,
PART I - BASIC PRINCIPLES, PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS 46 (1971); id. PART II
- SEXUAL CONDUCT, GAMBLING, PORNOGRAPHY 44-46, 55, 66 (1971).
34CALIFORNIA LOWER COURT STUDY 1-125 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
LOWER CoURT STUDY]; CALIFORNIA UNIFIED TRIAL COURT FEASIBILITY
STUDY 1-111 (1971) [hereinafter cited as UNIFIED TRIAL COURT STUDY].35 Task Force Reports at 1-2, 4.
36 J. JENNINGS, supra note 4. See a/so J. JENNINGS, THE FLOW OP DE-




Second, the internal structure of this court must be deline-
ated before it may be validly analyzed. In autumn 1971, the or-
ganization consisted of 25 judgeships, 7 of which 23 had been
filled at the time of this survey. Since that time the number of
judgeships for this court has risen to 28.38 These officials are
appointed by the governor of this state for 6-year terms, after
which they may seek re-election 39 (see figure 6).
FIGURE 6 The California Judicial Subsystem
40
Supreme Court -t Judicialconi
District Courts Administrative
of Appeal Office of Courts
SSpecial &Limited Jurisdiction
Municipal Courts: 75 Justice Courts
Superior Courts: 58 Civil: $5,000 or (rural): 244
Civil: over $5,000 less Civil: $500 orCrimial: Msde-less
Criminal: Mostly Criminal: Misde- Criminal: Misde-
felonies Small Claims: meanors
(6-YEAR TERMS) $200 or less Small Claims:(6-YAR TRMS)$200 or less
(6-YEAR TERMS) (6-YEAR TERMS)
A presiding judge is elected for a 1-year term by his peers
who rotate among four divisions: civil (with 19 judges), crim-
inal (with three judges), conciliation (with one judge), and
juvenile (also with a lone judge) (see figure 7).
Third, in September and October 1971, 20 judges (87 percent)
from a population of 23 consented to be interviewed with the
stipulation that their names remain confidential. Although Ron-
ald Reagan, the Governor of California, made two additional
37 CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 69595 (West Supp. 1972); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL-
FoRNIA, 1972 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT 112 (1972); JUDICIAL COUNCIL
OF CALIFORNIA, 1971 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT 152-53 (1971).
3 8
CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA ROSTER 1971-72, at 70
(1971).
39 CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 16(c)-(d).
40 CAL. CONST. arts. 5-11, art. 6, §§ 1, 3-5, 16(c); LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS
OF CALIFORNA, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 2 (1970); UNIFIED TRIAL
COURT STUDY at 10.
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Mental Judge (1) (4 Staff)
Health (1) (Elected) (4 Staff)
Secretarial
(7 Staff)
Conciliation Criminal Civil Juvenile
Division Division Division Division
(1 Judge) (3 Judges) (19 Judges) (1 Judge)
(1 Court (3 Court (19 Court (4 Court




appointments to this bench shortly before the start of this sur-
vey,42 the new judges were excluded because they had not
served in this position for a minimum of 1 year and had not
acquired extensive inside knowledge of the managerial problems
facing this organization. However, the 87-percent sample size
was certainly large enough to assure representativeness for the
valid extrapolation of findings from the sample to the rest of
the population.43 Fourth, because the idea of managerial con-
sciousness incorporates a melange of variables, this study sought
to discover the extent of this attribute in this court by em-
ploying six organizational variables: consolidation, specialization,
discipline, delay, leadership, and ideology.44 Since two of these
variables (delay and leadership) required the use of several
questions for thorough analysis, the questionnaire consisted of
14 items. 45 The queries germane to each variable were put in
mixed order in the questionnaire to reduce the possibility of re-
41 Interview with Larry Adams. former Secretary to the Superior Court,
now Jury Commissioner, San Francisco, 1971.
42 Reagan Names 2 to Superior Court, 3rd Judge Quits, San Diego Union,
Aug. 12, 1971, § B, at 1, 4.
43 H. BOYD & R. WESTFALL, MARKETING RESEARCH 378-82 (2d ed. 1964); E.
JONES, CONDUCTING POLITICAL RESEARCH 64-66 (1971).
44 MANAGING THE COURTS at 36-40, 61-64, 139-45, 156-60, 173-88.
45 See Apps. 1-3 infra.
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sponse sets, i.e., the inclination of respondents to answer items
of the same kind in a fixed manner despite their content46 (see
Appendix 3). In addition 11 background questions were included:
age, birthplace, religion, ethnic background, law school attended,
year of admission to law practice, political party affiliation,
public offices held before appointment to the current position,
year of appointment to the bench, and the names of ancestors
who served as judges or in other public offices in San Diego
County.4 7 The rationale for incorporating these additional items
into this survey was an attempt to determine their possible
impact on managerial attitudes.
Finally, the analysis of the garnered data consisted of four
segments: tabulations for each item, the calculation of percent-
ages, the determination of the mean (or average) as the best
measure of central tendency among almost all of the responses,
and the use of the highest correlation, if any, found between
organizational and demographic variables (Pearson's r).18
C. Principal Findings:
The principal findings of this study gravitate around the
six organizational variables of consolidation, specialization, dis-
cipline, congestion, leadership, and ideology which the 14 ques-
tions examine.
However, before presenting these findings, it is necessary to
review the background data for the respondents in this court
4 .1
in order to more thoroughly understand the results of this
study.50
The following 10 demographic items furnish a composite
picture of this institution and reveal a considerable degree of
background uniformity among the interviewed judges. This
uniformity is noteworthy because it implies that they have
46 F. KERLINGER, FOUNDATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, EDUCATION AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY 47 (1964).
47 See App. 4 infra.
48 The correlations were made by Standard Program Library No. 40 (SPL
40), a program on correlations and factor analysis assembled by the
Computer Center of San Diego State College. For two excellent sources
on correlations see H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 289 (1960) L. FREE-
MAN, ELEMENTARY APPLIED STAIISTICS FOR STUDENTS IN BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE 89-102 (1965).
"Pearson's r" is a shorthand for Karl Pearson's product moment
correlation. Its function is to discover interaction between two variables
which are measured in different units. The Pearson r range is from
-1.0 to +1.0, with negative readings indicating low correlation, positive
readings indicating higher correlation, and readings in excess of +.20 or
+.25 considered significantly correlated.
491 See App. 4 infra.
54 K. ARNOLD, CALIFORNIA COURTS AND JUDGES' HANDBOOK 314, 357-58, 361,
379, 429, 439, 443-44, 449, 457-58, 498, 544, 569, 574, 598-99, 603-04, 609;
id. at 75-76, 222 (Supp. 1969).
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reached approximately the same level of managerial conscious-
ness. First, although their ages range from 44 years to 69, the
largest category of interviewees (seven) fall in the age bracket
of 56 to 60, with 56 as the mean. Second, most respondents (75
percent) are natives of states other than California and thus
have migrated to the region. Third, a majority of interviewees
(60 percent) failed to divulge their religious affiliation, if any.
Of those persons who made this disclosure, Protestantism was
the leading preference. Fourth, all members of this bench are
white. Fifth, most respondents (80 percent) received their legal
education from schools within California. Sixth, although the
years that these persons became attorneys ranged from 1924 to
1954, the largest portion (nine) attained this position between
1946 and 1950 with 1943 as the mean year. Seventh, all the judges
reached their present occupation through one of three career
routes: private practice (50 percent), prosecutional work (30
percent), and previous judicial service, especially in a San Diego
area municipal court (20 percent). Eighth, although the years
during which these incumbents were appointed to this bench
varied from 1947 to 1970, a large proportion of the appointments
(11) were made from 1958 to 1966 (the tenure of California
Governor Edmund G. Brown) with 1963 as the mean year. Ninth,
among these interviewees there was virtually no lineage of
judicial or other public service.' Finally, although the party
identification of the respondents was evenly divided between
Democrats and Republicans at the time of this research, the
composition of this court has tilted decisively in favor of the
Republicans with the re-election of Governor Ronald Reagan in
1970 and the expansion in the number of judgeships from 25
to 28.52
1. Court Consolidation
The first managerial variable centers on judicial consolida-
tion, the merger of all trial courts within a particular area into
a single organization empowered with exclusive, comprehen-
sive, and original jurisdiction which is placed under the super-
vision of one official whose main task is the matching of case-
There was one exception whose father was a prominent San Diego
attorney for many years. See L. STANFORD, FOOTPRINTS OF JUSTICE IN
SAN DIEGO AND PROFILES OF SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE BENCH AND BAR
84, 142-43 (1959).
.,See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFOPNIA, 1972 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT
(1972); Reagan, supra note 42; Reagan Names Harelson To Superior
Court, San Diego Union, Aug. 26. 1970, § B, at 1; Reagan Names Leedy
to Superior Court. San Diego Union, June 17, 1970, § B, at 1; Reagan
Names San Diegans to Judgeship, San Diego Evening Tribune, Mar. 6,
1972, § A, at 2; Reagan Names Two Judges to Bench Here, San Diego
Union, Dec. 16, 1971, § B, at 6.
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load requirements with the efficient deployment of judges.5"
This variable merited primary attention not only because the
mere knowledge of its meaning implies a high level of mana-
gerial consciousness but also because such a change may be
imminent in this state mainly as a result of the worsening con-
gestion in these agencies. 4 The Judicial Council of California
(a staff agency of the state supreme court which loosely super-
vises the California courts)55 may soon recommend to the state
legislature that the municipal and justice courts (the lower
courts) in each of the 58 counties of California be combined
into single tribunals with corresponding jurisdiction.56 Although
this partial consolidation is likely, the central issue may focus
on the desirability of extending such consolidation to the su-
perior courts.
57
In brief, three plans will probably receive attention from
the Judicial Council and the state legislature. The least drastic
proposal would merge the lower courts into county courts and
retain the superior courts. Both courts would feature direction
by a single chief judge as well as centralized administrative serv-
ices (such as security forces, reporters, and secretaries). A
second plan reaches further by merging all trial courts into
a single entity with two kinds of personnel: superior court
judges and associate superior court judges. The associate super-
ior court judges would consist of the present municipal and
justice court officials. The new organization would also offer
unified supervision and managerial services. A third plan,
which in the recent past has garnered much legislative support,
is the most drastic because it would combine all trial courts
into one organization with a single chief judge and with central-
ized administrative services.
58
In this political atmosphere, it was expected that the judges
of the San Diego County Superior Court would be overwhelm-
ingly critical of consolidation plans, regardless of their specific
content. This supposition rested on three bases: the attitudes
that other sources had found in their impressionistic encounters
5 3 
UNIFIED TRIAL COURT STUDY at 7, 16, 60-61.
54 LowER CouRT STmY at 50, 69-72; UNIFIED TRIAL CoUr STUDY at 45-47.
55 CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 1 (a).
56 Judicial Council Seeks to Reduce Court Congestion, Develop Uniform
System of Judicial Administration, 11 CAL. J. 337-38, 347 (1971).
5 7 UNFE TRIAL COURT STUDY at 53.
58 UNIFIED TRIAL COURT STUDY at 49-52.
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with these officials," ' the reluctance of these presently higher-
court officials to handle the spate of typical municipal and
justice court business (minor criminal and civil cases), 6° and
a threat to the status of these judges who tended to view the
lower courts as a training ground for judges wanting to advance
to a superior court position.1 However, when these respondents
were asked about their attitude toward judicial consolidation
(Question 1), the opposition to this idea only slightly exceeded
the approval of it.
62
At least four factors may account for this result. First,
since the understanding of consolidation presumes a high degree
of managerial consciousness, a substantial minority of judges
may have attained such a degree of consciousness that they
perceive its necessity for reducing criminal and civil case de-
lay, for lowering expenses, and for achieving greater efficiency.
A second possibility is a resignation to its inevitability in Cali-
fornia. A third reason may be that some judges feel confident
about dominating the operational patterns in a unified trial
court apparatus. A fourth consideration is the impact of demo-
graphic variables, especially the year of an interviewee's admis-
sion to practice and his age, since the tendency among judges
to favor trial court consolidation in California varies directly
with these two characteristics. The correlations between the
answers to this question and these two characteristics are 0.52
and 0.49, respectively.
2. Judicial Specialization
The second managerial variable focuses on specialization
and consists of two facets: a division of labor and a compart-
mentalization of tasks."I To measure both aspects of this variable,
this study used a pair of questions. One question centered on
the first kind of specialization, the tendency of a judge to hear
certain types of cases for an indefinite time. When asked how
often judges should be shifted from one section of this court
59) See the consolidated measures that California Assemblyman James A.
Hayes (R. Long Beach) has made repeatedly which parallel the third
plan described in this article. Cal. Assembly Const. Amend. No. 20
(intro. Jan. 20, 1972); Cal. A.B. 159 (intro. Jan. 20, 1972); Cal. A.B. 1400
(intro. Mar. 30, 1971); Cal. A.B. 2397 (intro. Apr. 3, 1970). See also
Cal. Senate Const. Amend. No. 57 (intro. Mar. 16, 1972) by Alfred H.
Song (D. 28th Dist.).
"o UNIFIED TRIAL COUier STUDY at 53; Judiciary Consolidation Opposed, San
Diego Union, Sepot. 9, 1971, § A, at 4.
61 UNIFIED TRIAL COURT STUDY at 53.
62 See App. 3, Question 1 [hereinafter, all references to questions will
refer to App. 3].
63 W. BENNIS, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 4 (1970); MANAGING THE CouRTs at
27, 157-58; M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND EcONOMIc ORGANIZA-
TION 225-28, 261 (A. Henderson, T. Parsons transl. 1947).
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to another (Question 2), the judges revealed a deep fissure in
their opinions. One-half of the respondents said that they should
be rotated among the four segments of this court (civil, criminal,
conciliational, and juvenile) every 10-to-12 months. Implicit in
this finding are the beliefs that each judge should complete a
rotational cycle among the divisions of this court within a 4-year
period and that this duration is the minimum span necessary
for a judge to become conversant with the administrative prob-
lems of this organization. However, nearly as many judges (40
percent) failed to respond to this item. At least two factors
may explain this dichotomy. One is a discrepancy in the man-
agerial consciousness attained by these two groups of inter-
viewees. The first group, which opted for rotation, may evidence
this awareness because of the intermediate time period that
they chose: long enough to permit a judge to understand the
operational difficulties in each division but not so lengthy as
to encourage boredom, stagnation, and myopia. The other group,
which failed to respond to this question, may not have attained
such a level of managerial consciousness. A second factor in
explaining this dichotomy is party identification because the
tendency to favor certain rotational time periods tended to vary
directly with this demographic attribute. Generally, Demo-
cratic appointees inclined toward a fixed duration whereas Re-
publicans preferred a noncommittal attitude. The correlation
between the answers to this question and partisan affiliation
was 0.41.
The second item on specialization (Question 6) centers on
a delineation of basic tasks. When asked about the desirability
of establishing another section (a sentencing division) to com-
plement the other four sections of this court, the mean response
(3.3) was one of uncertainty or mild opposition at most. Such
an overall answer may divulge a high degree of managerial con-
sciousness for three possible reasons. First, these judges may be
reluctant to delegate a long-standing prerogative: the power to
sentence. Second, they may believe that the creation of such a
division may exert only a marginal pressure for reducing delay
because a change may signify merely a redistribution of the
same caseload. Third, since 80 percent of the interviewees re-
plied to this query, it may validly be concluded that they re-
garded themselves as possessing sufficient administrative knowl-
edge to comment on this subject. Finally, it should be noted
that the tendency to favor the establishment of such a section




The third organizational variable explores the forms of
intra-organizational discipline that a judge may receive from
his peers, especially a transfer from one section of this court
to another. When the reasons for such shifts were sought
(Question 3), most respondents claimed that this kind of change
usually occurs for one of the following reasons: mounting con-
gestion in another division, a personal preference to handle other
types of litigation, or a reaction to overwork. All these professed
reasons are nondisciplinary. Stated another way, these inter-
viewees asserted that a judge in this court would seldom, if ever,
be disciplined by this method even if he were involved in one
or more of the following situations: excessive awards in civil
bench trials, inordinate fining, excessive sentencing, insufficient
awards in civil bench cases, lenient sentencing, local bar asso-
ciation opposition to a judge's decisions, partiality to defendants,
a bias toward plaintiffs, too many decisions unpopular with fel-
low judges, an excessive number of decisions opposed by the
presiding judge, numerous decisions resulting in public indig-
nation, and too many decisions leading to criticism from other
public officials. Unlike the conclusions for the first two man-
agerial variables, the results for this one suggest the first limit
concerning the extent of managerial consciousness developed
by these judges. At least four considerations point toward such
a finding. First, in a consolidated trial court apparatus, one
function of a chief judge would be to define the precise circum-
stances that would govern the application of this informal sanc-
tion. Second, they may be satisfied that the use of peremptory
challenges by litigants constitutes adequate discipline for way-
ward judges.6 4 Third, the average percentage of respondents to
this series of items (78.5 percent) is slightly lower than the
corresponding items for the first variable (consolidation) and
part of the second variable (specialization). Finally, the average
correlation between a disposition toward practices invoking this
sanction and the year of one's appointment to this bench is high
enough (0.51) to intimate that newer members of this organi-
zation tend to favor more discipline over judicial conduct than
do judges with more seniority.
4. Delay
The fourth managerial variable probes the criminal and
civil case delay in this organization. Because this difficulty is
the foremost administrative problem facing this court, the ques-
6 4
CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 170.1-.7 (West Supp. 1972).
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tionnaire includes four questions (4, 5, 8, and 10) to examine
this characteristic.
Question 4 asks the respondents to rate 24 proposed remedies
for delay according to their surmised efficacy in alleviating this
trouble.6 5 These proposed remedies fall into two basic categories:
fundamental and accelerative. The fundamental denotes man-
agerial changes that attempt to reduce the flow of certain cases
(inputs) into this court whereas the accelerative category tries
to speed the flow of cases through this bureaucracy by altering
administrative procedures, i.e., a quicker conversion of inputs
into outputs (see figure 2).
Seven of the suggested remedies in Question 4 explore in-
puts of three kinds: case, legal, and managerial. The first of
these inputs centers on criminal and civil litigation; the second,
on law affecting the types of cases entering this court; and
the third, on the personnel needed to operate this organization
efficiently. One of the seven remedies delved into case inputs
by seeking the judges' attitudes toward automobile accident
compensation plans that emulate workmen's compensation. The
mean response (3.0) was one of uncertainty probably because
this item amounts to a proposal for change from the tort sys-
tem to what are commonly called no-fault automobile insurance
programs. Two of the seven remedies inquire about legal inputs:
the abolition of jury trials generally and the elimination of
such trials in personal injury cases. The average responses (3.4
and 3.1, respectively) approximated uncertainty most likely
because these two items invoke far-reaching changes. The re-
maining four remedies of the seven consider managerial in-
puts: more court days, more judges, night court sessions, and
the greater use of auditors or referees to assist judges. Although
the mean responses to these items (4.4, 3.0, 3.3, and 2.9, respec-
tively), denote uncertainty, except for strong opposition to ad-
ditional court days, this indecision may stem from a suspicion
that these inputs will exert only a marginal influence on the
delay problem in this court.
Another 10 remedies of Question 4 examine acceleration of
the judicial process, i.e., accelerating conversion of system inputs
into system outputs. When ranged on a continuum from most
favorable to most hostile of four categories, the average re-
sponses of these judges to the items rank as follows: [1] more
65 The numbers in parentheses throughout this section represent the means
of the numbered evaluations in App. 3, Question 4. Questions were
derived from H. ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 51-52, 85, 89, 98-99, 108, 119, 124,
128. 140, 151, 154, 166-67, 174, 180, 193, 198, 202, 209.
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use of devices to increase settlements, i.e., certificates of readi-
ness to put cases on the court calendar (1.7), the greater use
of impartial medical witnesses in civil cases (2.0), additional
pretrial conferences (2.6), and payment of interest by losing
parties to cover the delay from answer to verdict (3.9); [2] the
adoption of split-trial procedures, i.e., separating liability and
damage proceedings (1.9); [3] the acceleration of jury trials by
the increased use of four devices, i.e., a judge's curbing of what
he considers repetitive testimony (2.2), judicial participation in
the examination of witnesses (2.4), a judge's assuming more
rigorous charge of trials (2.5), and a judge's discouragement of
what he regards as perfunctory objections (2.7); and [4] the
more stringent supervision of judges by the presiding judge
(2.9). These first 10 acceleration remedies were generally ap-
proved perhaps because they center on what judges may do
through their individual efforts to mitigate delay and because
these proposed changes may be fairly easy to implement.
However, the respondents professed uncertainty about the
efficacy of three other conversion acceleration remedies: the
use of inducements to spur more jury trial waivers, particularly
the substitution of a comparative rather than a contributory
negligence rule in exchange for such a waiver (3.0); a reduction
of trial-scheduling gaps by changing from a calendar system to
an assignment system (3.1); and clearing the docket of cases
unready for trial at their initially scheduled time (3.3). For
these remedies the uncertain responses may have resulted from
the inability of these judges to foresee what impact these
suggestions, if effected, might have on reducing delay in this
organization.
Three other suggested remedies attracted unfavorable mean
responses among these judges: the compulsory arbitration of
small claims (3.9), an enlarged trial bar (4.1), and the use of
a level court calendar- a more equitable distribution of court
congestion by the disposition of older cases first (4.3). This op-
position probably reflects doubts about the effectiveness of
these proposed remedies in alleviating such delay.
The last remedy of Question 4 centers on the interviewee's
attitudes toward weekly public disclosures of the caseload han-
dled by each judge. One item sufficed to cover this area since
decisions constitute the principal judicial output. The average
response was one of uncertainty (3.3), a surprising conclusion
because the judges could have been expected to oppose such
reports, which might be later used against them, especially
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during re-election. These judges may simply have been unable
to forecast what pressure such reports would exert on judges
to speed their work.
Finally, although the answers given for this collection of
24 possible remedies for delay uncover a considerable degree of
managerial consciousness, its extent is not nearly as high as
it was for the first three organizational variables of consolida-
tion, specialization, and discipline. Two considerations support
the conclusion that this question discloses a second limit in
these judges' development of managerial consciousness. First,
an average of only 71.5 percent of the respondents answered
this question on delay-the lowest percentage of responses
except for the replies to the second part of the consolidation
variable. Second, the replies to these items did not correlate
strongly with any of the demographic variables, with the pos-
sible exception of the year of a judge's appointment to the bench
whose mean correlation with this group of queries was 0.36.
Unlike Question 4, which centers on judicial attitudes to-
ward suggested devices for influencing the inputs, conversion
process, and output of the court, Queston 5 focuses on judicial
perceptions of delay in the middle (conversion or adjudicating)
process, especially that caused by attorneys. The judges were
asked about their views concerning what impact, if any, six
types of counsel may have on the court time devoted to cases.
The types of attorneys considered were client-paid attorneys,
group-paid lawyers, out-of-town attorneys, county-salaried pub-
lic defenders, counsel from the Legal Aid Society and similar
organizations, and assigned counsel.6 6 The mean response among
the judges indicated that client-paid attorneys tended to hasten
judicial proceedings (2.5); that the next four types exerted an
uncertain impact on the case flow (3.0, 3.3, 3.3, and 3.6, respec-
tively), but that assigned counsel tended to impede the con-
version process (3.9). Based upon this data, two factors suggest
the third limit in the interviewee's managerial consciousness.
First, although 76.5 percent of the judges replied to this series
of items, the high incidence of uncertain responses implies that
the administrative distinctions requested were too subtle for
them to make intelligently. Second, there were no important
correlations between the answers to these items and background
variables.
Question 8, the third question centering on the delay vari-
able, is a continuation of Question 5. Of the eight items in this
66 B. CooK, TBE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN CALIFORNIA 81-87 (1967).
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question (all of which explore the conversion or adjudicating
process), three (37.5 percent) were viewed by the respondents
as serious causes of delay: the nonavailability of witnesses at
trials (1.3), too many requests for continuances by the defense
(1.4), and an excessive number of motions by the defense (1.5).
The average reply for the remaining five items reflected the
attitude that these items constituted minor causes of delay in
this court: excessive requests for continuances by plaintiffs
(1.7), too many prosecutional motions (2.0), an inordinate num-
ber of defense objections (2.0), a plethora of objections by the
prosecution (2.0), and too many prosecutions (2.0).
The answers to this question imply a fourth limit on the
degree of managerial consciousness validly attributable to these
judges. This evaluation rests on the following considerations.
First, although the respondents tend to ascribe delay more to
the behavior of the defense than to the prosecution in criminal
or plaintiff in civil cases, this preference is marginal because
they have not generally reached a level of awareness that en-
ables them to make the sensitive judgments required by these
items. Second, the mean number of answers to this series of
queries amounted to 66 percent- the lowest level for the ques-
tions considered so far. Third, the answers to these items failed
to correlate strongly with any of the demographic variables
with the possible exception of the year of a judge's appointment
to the bench (0.39).
Question 10, the last one relating to the delay variable,
focuses on a case input item because it probes the judges' per-
ceptions as to whether the change of some felonies into mis-
demeanors (a recent alteration in the state penal code)
67 sig-
nificantly reduced the workload in this court. In answering this
question, the interviewees divided evenly in estimating the
impact of this measure on the extent of delay in this organiza-
tion. Like the previous question, number 8, this question sug-
gests a fifth limit on the development of managerial awareness
in the respondents. Two reasons largely account for this con-
clusion. First, 40 percent of the judges- the largest number
so far--expressed uncertainty on this item. Second, the ten-
dency toward indecision correlated highly with the increased
age of the interviewee (0.56).
5. Leadership
This fifth organizational variable also contains four ques-
tions (7, 11, 13, and 14). This attribute merits as much attention
67 CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b) (5) (West Supp. 1972).
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as the delay variable because competent judicial leadership
is a sine qua non for alleviating the trial court delay. Such
leadership entails the efficient management of eight other tasks
besides delay: the court calendar (or case assignment process),
data processing, finances, juries and witnesses, personnel, plan-
ning, public relations, and space.68 All questions germane to this
variation (except for Question 13) center on the main judicial
executive in this organization, the presiding judge.
Question 7 seeks the interviewee's attitudes toward the best
method for the selection of a presiding judge. The respondents
unanimously favored the choice of this administrator by secret
ballot, a continuation of the present mode. Obversely, no one
favored the other two enumerated methods, appointment of
this official by the Judicial Council of California6 9 or by senior-
ity. Nor did these respondents avail themselves of the oppor-
tunity to volunteer any other method. The replies to this ques-
tion suggest a considerable degree of managerial awareness to-
ward the salience of this variable. Two pieces of information
buttress this finding. First, 90 percent of the judges answered
this question. Second, the correlation of the responses to this
item with the demographic characteristics was zero.
Question 11 seeks to ascertain the judges' views about the
optimal tenure for this manager, the presiding judge. At pres-
ent, although this official is elected by his peers for a 1-year
term, 70 he is customarily re-elected for a second year because,
as one judge commented, he needs approximately 1 year to
learn the many facets of his role. Again, all the interviewees
favored a de facto 2-year term for the presiding judge. Stated
another way, no one favored an extension of this official's
tenure to cover 3 or more years. Such a lengthened term might
be a means to augment leadership skills, but the price for this
change might be a diminution of his accountability to his peers.
Furthermore, no one favored a tenure of less than 2 years,
although that period would increase the peer accountability at
the expense of reducing leadership skills. Finally, although the
100 percent response rate and the zero correlation between the
answers to this query and the background attributes imply a
high level of managerial consciousness, it is possible to be
skeptical because a far longer term may be essential for this
68H. JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA 81-82, 139 (1965); D. SAART, MODEMN
COURT MANAGEMENT: TRENDS IN THE ROLE OF THE COURT ExEcuTIvE 3-10
(1970).
69 CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 1(a).
70 CAL. RU.ES OF COURT 252-55 (West 1970).
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judicial leader to acquire expertise. An indefinite appointment
by his peers or by the judicial council may be the eventual
device to promote such skill, especially in a consolidated trial
court apparatus.
71
Question 14 tries to discover what the interviewees regarded
as the most significant managerial abilities needed to fulfill
the role of presiding judge. The judges who answered this
question believed that the presiding judge should exhibit two
principal qualities: the ability to organize the workload of this
court and considerable seniority. However, this query uncovered
the sixth and final limit in the development of managerial
consciousness among these respondents because only half of
the interviewees (the lowest response rate so far) completed
this item and because the more recent appointees tended to
check the listed attributes rather than leave this question blank.
The correlation between a reply to this query and the year of
a judge's appointment to this bench was mildly positive (0.32).
Question 13, the last question focusing on the leadership
variable, shifts emphasis from the selection, tenure, and man-
agerial traits of the presiding judge to a typology of the serious
and minor administrative problems facing this official. This
query consists of 20 managerial items culled from two noted
sources. 7 " On a mean basis, the respondents viewed only the
task of case scheduling as critical (1.4). They perceived 13
other functions as significant: the assignment of judges (1.6),
the maintenance of courtroom security (1.6), the continuation
of rapport with fellow judges (1.8), evaluating practices and
procedures (1.8), the keeping of good relations with the court
staff (1.9), satisfactory public relations (1.9), the establishment
and organization of divisions, departments, or districts (2.1), the
setting up of court committees (2.2), the assessment of judicial
competence (2.3), the facilitation of intra-organizational com-
munications (2.4), the expansion of courtroom space (2.4), the
garnering of appropriations (2.4), and the use of computers
(2.4). Among the minor tasks perceived to be confronting the
presiding judge are the remaining six: the maintenance of
court records (2.5), the measurement of judicial output (2.5),
the training of a court staff (2.5), budgeting (2.6), the recruit-
ment of staff members (2.8), and the disciplining of judges (2.9).
The answers to this group of items reveal much administrative
consciousness among the respondents because 78 percent of
71 LowER CoURT STUDY at 72-76; UNIFIED TRIAL COURT STUDY 93-99.
72 See sources cited note 68 supra.
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them, on the average, replied and because their inclination to
answer varied directly with the year of their appointment to
this bench (0.62).
6. Political Ideology
The sixth organizational variable centers on political ide-
ology, which is germane to a consideration of managerial con-
sciousness because extreme political beliefs may interfere with
unbiased development of managerial consciousness. To analyze
this variable, two questions (9 and 12), each of which contains
numerous components, were employed. Question 9 asked wheth-
er, in these judges' views, the ethnic composition of the federal
and state courts should be generally proportionate to the racial
composition of the jurisdictional area. This question consisted
of nine court types: the United States Supreme Court, the United
States Courts of Appeal, the United States District Courts, the
California Supreme Court, the California District Courts of
Appeal, the superior courts in the state generally, the superior
court of San Diego County, the municipal courts in the state gen-
erally, and the Municipal Court for the San Diego Judicial Dis-
trict. For all the judicial organizations listed, the average re-
sponses for each item tended toward political moderation as evi-
denced by the answers which varied within a narrow range from
favorable to uncertain. Such middle-of-the-road views may rein-
force the respondents' managerial consciousness by encouraging
a pragmatic or technical outlook toward administrative problems
rather than a political one. Two considerations support this
assessment. First, 80 percent of the judges answered this ques-
tion. Second, the inclination of the respondents to sanction this
proposal varied directly with party affiliation (0.62) and age
(0.58) in that proponents of this idea tended to be Democrats
and young judges.
Question 12 represents a deeper probe into the impact of
political outlooks on the growth of managerial consciousness
among the interviewees. This query consists of 15 items to which
favorable answers connote a liberal orientation; uncertain re-
sponses, a moderate outlook; and unfavorable replies, a con-
servative perspective.7 3 Three items (20 percent) yielded mean
responses classifiable as liberal: a disposition to support claim-
ants in unemployment cases (1.7), an inclination to expand
the scope of the first amendment to the United States Consti-
tution (1.8), and a tendency to favor public employees in strike
73 Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL. ScI.
REv. 843 (1961).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
cases (1.8). Of the 12 remaining sections of this question, the
mean outlooks are near the middle of the response scale since
their proclivity to favor consumers in sales-of-goods cases aver-
ages 2.0; the labor union in management cases, 2.0; the em-
ployee in injury suits, 2.0; the state government in tax cases,
2.3; the injured person in motor vehicle accident cases, 2.3;
the tenant in landlord cases, 2.3; the wife in divorce cases, 2.3;
the finding of a constitutional violation in criminal cases, 2.5;
the support of college students in police cases, 2.6; the admin-
istrative agency in business regulation litigation, 2.8; the debtor
in a dispute with a creditor, 2.8; and the defense in criminal
cases, 2.8. This political moderation stems primarily from partisan
affiliation. This conclusion is derived from the fact that the
disposition toward more liberal answers correlates positively
(0.57) with Democratic Party membership. Much of this cen-
trism emanates from the Democratic judges who had been ap-
pointed by former California Governor Edmund G. Brown.
However, as his successor, Ronald Reagan, replaces resigning
Democratic appointees with Republicans 4 and as the size of
this organization increases,7 5 the ideological outlook of this court
may become much more conservative, although probably not
to such an extreme degree that the continued development of
managerial awareness in this court would be seriously impaired.
Finally, the finding of political centrism in this organization is
tentative because the mean response rate for these items was
only 56 percent of the judges. The low percentage probably
stems from the sensitive nature of this query.
CONCLUSION
Three noted court management scholars have commented
that "[T]he courts have not achieved the same measure of
success as other bureaucracies have in terms of efficiency or in
effectiveness in relating to clientele groups. ' '76 Increased mana-
gerial awareness among judges may foster such efficiency not
only in the Superior Court of San Diego County but also in
other state and federal trial courts. This article has sought to
devise a managerial-consciousness model in order to explain
how judicial organizations maintain themselves, particularly in
an urban trial court setting. This model consists of three propo-
sitions. First, such awareness grows from the convergence of
internal and external pressures on this bureaucracy. In the
74 See sources cited notes 42, 52 supra.
75 See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 27.
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court examined in this article, the primary intrinsic force was
the mounting delay in the handling of criminal and civil cases.
The main extrinsic pressure was the increased likelihood of
consolidation which would place this organization and the
other trial courts in the state under centralized-and probably
more stringent - direction. Both forces have become typical of
what engenders managerial consciousness in other urban trial
courts. To measure such awareness, this study employed six
indicators: consolidation, specialization, discipline, delay, lead-
ership, and ideology. In brief, the mean response was opposi-
tion to consolidation tempered by resignation to its eventual
achievement. The judges favored a specialization of labor to
a greater extent than a division of tasks because the former
tends to encourage judicial expertise whereas the latter in-
creases the probability of stagnation. The interviewees gen-
erally opposed a tightening of discipline over judicial conduct,
a likelihood in a consolidated trial court apparatus. The re-
spondents tended to favor an accelerative rather than funda-
mental approach to the problem of alleviating delay in this
organization. Stated another way, they supported devices for
speeding the flow of litigation through this subsystem within
the justice process rather than seeking to curb some case in-
puts. Furthermore, the interviewees favored the perpetuation
of the current leadership mode, for they professed general satis-
faction with the selection and tenure of the presiding judge.
Finally, they subscribed to an ideology of political centrism,
which is consistent with the further development of managerial
consciousness.
Although their outlooks toward the three organizational vari-
ables of consolidation, specialization, and ideology facilitate the
continued maintenance of this trial court, their attitudes toward
the remaining three variables may inhibit their ability to reduce
delay and to adapt to a new judicial milieu, the consolidated
court. Impelled by rising congestion and the promise of sub-
stantial reductions in judicial operating expenses,77 trial court
consolidation in California may be completed by the year 1976.78
Accompanying such consolidation may be more rigorous disci-
pline on judicial behavior and a far more powerful court leader-
ship. Moreover, another concomitant may be a drastic approach
to eliminate delay. Such a thrust may cut off numerous case
inputs. Litigation centering on what are sometimes called vic-
UNIFIED TRIAL COURT STUDY at 105-06.
7s See UNIFIED TRIAL COURT STUDY at 60, 68-73.
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timless crimes 79 (such as drunkenness, minor drug abuse, gam-
bling, vagrancy, abortions, and the sexual behavior of con-
senting adults) may be eradicated. Supplementing this approach
may be the greater use of plea-bargaining to expedite the flow
of the remaining criminal cases through this subsystem.80 Fur-
thermore, numerous civil suits involving personal injuries and
probate matters"' may be removed from judicial organizations
by what are commonly labeled as no-fault insurance programs 2
and by increased out-of-court settlements.
The second part of the managerial consciousness model sug-
gests that the acquired managerial consciousness results in sub-
stantial changes to alleviate problems. With respect to this study,
a heightened sense of managerial consciousness toward disci-
pline, delay, and leadership might have enabled the judges in
this court to exert more control over their internal and external
problems by formulating and publicizing their own proposals
for organizational changes to solve these problems. These pro-
posals would have helped this organization to co-opt extrinsic
pressures and to press its own ideas rather than to respond to
the projects of other agencies, such as the judicial council in
the state.
Finally, the third premise of the managerial-consciousness
model states that the changes, in correcting the present prob-
lems, create less serious troubles which can be solved as the
judges repeat this three-part process of the managerial-con-
sciousness model. Thus, a heightened sense of managerial con-
sciousness among trial court judges is a prerequisite for moving
a step closer to the attainment of a more efficient judicial sub-
system within the justice funnel (see figures 1 and 2). It is
hoped this type of efficiency will result in a heightened sense
of managerial consciousness that will allow the approximation
of a goal recently stated by President Nixon:
The ultimate goal of changing the process of justice is not
to put more people in jail or merely to provide a faster flow of
litigation, it is to resolve conflict speedily but fairly, to reverse
the trend toward crime and violence, to reinstill a respect for
law in all our people.8 3
7'1N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME
CONTROL 2-24 (1970).
S," See sources cited note 23 supra.
81 A Remark by Hon. W. Craig Biddle, a member of the California Assem-
bly (R. Riverside County) as a participant in the Court Reform
Panel at the California Conference of the American Society for Public
Administration in San Diego, Cal., Feb. 19, 1972.
S2 Illinois No-Fault Law Invalidation Upheld, L.A. Times, Mar. 24, 1972,
§ 1, at 17; State Bar Propose Modified No-Fault Insurance, L.A. Times,
Mar. 1, 1972, § 1, at 3.




Organizational Variables: Mixed Question Numbers:
1. Consolidation: #1
2. Specialization: #2, #6
3. Discipline: #3
4. Delay: #4, #5, #8, #10
5. Leadership: #7, #11, #13, #14
6. Ideology: #9, #12
APPENDIX 2
COVER LETTER
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND URBAN STUDIES
SAN DIEGO STATE COLLEGE
Dear Judge .................................. .:
As an associate professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies at
San Diego State College, I have had a deep professional interest in judicial
management, especially at the trial-court level. Three years ago I explored
the managerial problems facing the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.
Now I need your assistance to examine the management operations of the
Superior Court of San Diego County. Therefore, I would be most apprecia-
tive if you would please complete the accompanying questionnaires before
your interviews with my research assistants (Mr. Marshall Bear, Mrs.
Romney Cohen, and Mrs. June Kaiser) and me. Thank you.
Most respectfully,
James A. Gazell, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Public
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DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS
1. N am e: ..............................







3. Birthplace: 15 (Outside California: 75.0%) 5 (In California: 25.0%)




5. Race: 20 (Caucasian: 100.0%)
6. Law School Attended: 2 16 (In California: 80.0%);
2 4 (Outside California: 20.0%);
(U.S.C.: 20.0%);20 4(Balboa, later California Western: 20.0%);
(Miscellaneous: 35.0%)









8. Previous Public Offices Held Before Becoming a Superior
Court Judge:
Private Sector:
Private Practice 11 (55.0%)
Public Sector:
1. Municipal Court 3 (15.0%)
2. Prosecutor 3 (15.0%)
3. City Attorney 2 (10.0%)
4. State Elective Office 1 (5.0%)
Total: 20 (100.0%)
9. Year Appointed to This Bench: Mean: 1963; Range: 1947-1970
Before 1953 (Appointees of Governor Earl Warren) 1 (5.0%)
1953-1958 (Appointees of Gov. Goodwin Knight) 2 (10.0%)
1959-1966 (Appointees of Gov. Edmund G. Brown) 11 (55.0%)
1967-1970 (Appointees of Gov. Ronald Reagan) 6 (30.0%)
Total: 20 (100.0%)
Supplement:
1971 (Appointees of Gov. Ronald Reagan) 3
1972 (Appointees of Gov. Ronald Reagan) 2
Total: 5
(All together: 11) i.e., 6 ± 5
10. Names of Ancestors Who Served as Judges or in other Public
or Private Positions in San Diego County:
19 (None: 95.0%); 1 (5.0%)
528
11. Political Party Af
Optional Signature:
Date:




Supplement (1972) 10 (Democrats: 37.0%);
17 (Republicans: 63.0%)
All..in..Se...embe..-October...........................1971............All in September-October 1971
